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Abstract
Integrity of elections is vital to democratic sys-
tems, but it is frequently threatened by mali-
cious actors. The study of algorithmic com-
plexity of the problem of manipulating elec-
tion outcomes by changing its structural fea-
tures is known as election control. One means
of election control that has been proposed is to
select a subset of issues that determine voter
preferences over candidates. We study a vari-
ation of this model in which voters have judg-
ments about relative importance of issues, and
a malicious actor can manipulate these judg-
ments. We show that computing effective ma-
nipulations in this model is NP-hard even with
two candidates or binary issues. However, we
demonstrate that the problem is tractable with
a constant number of voters or issues. Addi-
tionally, while it remains intractable when vot-
ers can vote stochastically, we exhibit an im-
portant special case in which stochastic voting
enables tractable manipulation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Fair elections are at the core of democratic sys-
tems. However, elections are increasingly sub-
ject to attack by malicious parties who aim to
achieve personal goals at the expense of the social
good [Caldwell et al., 2019]. The problem of elec-
tion vulnerability to malicious attack has been stud-
ied in the broader literature on election control and
bribery [Bartholdi III et al., 1992, Tomz and Houweling,
2008, Faliszewski and Rothe, 2016]. However, in much
of this literature, control is exercised through a change
in the election structure (e.g., adding and removing can-
didates), or directly the preferences of a subset of voters
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(bribery). A major means of election control that has of-
ten been overlooked in the research literature is manip-
ulation of issues that ultimately determine voter prefer-
ences over candidates.
A recent model of election control through issue selec-
tion attempts to bridge this gap [Lu et al., 2019]. The ba-
sis of this model is the spatial theory of voting [Downs,
1957, Enelow and Hinich, 1984], in which voters and
candidates are represented as points in issue space, and
a distance metric determines relative preferences, with
voters preferring candidates who are similar to them on
issues. In control through issue selection, a malicious
party can select a subset of issues that then determines
similarity and, consequently, voter preferences.
While capturing some of the intuition about the kinds
of manipulations we commonly see (through, say,
the spread of misinformation and fake news), control
through issue selection nevertheless misses an essen-
tial factor: what is ultimately important, and what is at
the core of manipulation is the relative significance, or
salience, of issues, with issue selection being a rather
extreme special case. A recent examples that illus-
trates this point is Brexit: Until 2016, the significance
of the issue of U.K. membership in the EU was com-
paratively negligible [Khetani-Shah and Deutsch, 2019].
In 2016, it became one of the central issues, with con-
siderable evidence pointing to Russian interference as
a factor [Harper et al., 2019, Sabbagh et al., 2019]. In
general, malicious parties can impact perceptions of rel-
ative issue importance in a variety of ways. For exam-
ple, fake social media accounts can be used to coordi-
nate widespread mentions of particular issues, increas-
ing their salience compared to others. Similarly, influ-
ential individuals, such as celebrities or politicians, may
be willing to accept payments to be more or less vocal
about particular issues. To reflect the relative difficulty
or cost of these actions we limit the attacker by one of
two constraints.
Our model is a significant generalization of the work
of Lu et al. [2019]. In our version, preferences of a voter
over candidates are generated based on similarity in is-
sue space, weighted by the relative importance of issues.
We study the complexity of this problem in the context of
plurality elections for two common models of voter be-
havior in the spatial framework: 1) deterministic voting,
in which voters always vote for their most preferred can-
didate, and 2) stochastic voting, where the probability of
a voter voting for a candidate is a monotonic function of
weighted issue similarity. We show that the control prob-
lem is in general NP-hard in either case, even with only 2
candidates. Indeed, for the deterministic case we demon-
strate hardness even with onlyΘ(ℓ) voters, where ℓ is the
number of issues. Next, we exhibit several tractable spe-
cial cases. In the deterministic case, if the number of
voters is Θ(log(ℓ)), or the number of issues is constant,
election control is in P. In stochastic voting, in turn, con-
trol is tractable if the probability of voting for a candidate
is linear in their weighted distance from the voter.
Related Work The complexity of controlling elections
has seen extensive treatment, starting with the work
of Bartholdi III et al. [1992]; see Hemaspaandra et al.
[2007], Menton [2013], Erde´lyi et al. [2015], Chen et al.
[2017] for further examples and the survey by
Faliszewski and Rothe [2016] for an overview. Vari-
ations of this problem consider attacks that add,
remove, partition or clone candidates or voters, for a
variety of voting rules. However, most of the prior
election control literature considers election mod-
els in which voter preferences over candidates are
given, rather than generated based on distance in
issue space. The spatial model of elections, in turn,
has received considerable attention in prior litera-
ture [Davis and Hinich, 1966, Enelow and Hinich,
1984, 1990, McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1990,
Merrill and Groffman, 1999, Anshelevich et al., 2018,
Anshelevich and Postl, 2017]. However, most of this
research has focused on problems other than election
control. For example, extensive literature exists on
game-theoretic models in which candidates opportunis-
tically select positions in issue space [Downs, 1957,
Shen and Wang, 2017, Sabato et al., 2017].
A direct precursor to our model, combining election con-
trol with spatial theory of voting, is Lu et al. [2019], who
study the model in which an adversary can select an arbi-
trary subset of issues in an election. These issues are then
used to generate voter preferences over candidates, with
voters preferring candidates who are closest to them on
the adversarially selected issues. We significantly gen-
eralize this model by allowing the adversary to change
relative importance of issues.
2 MODEL
Let C = {c1, ..., cm} and V = {v1, ...,vn} be a set of
candidates and voters, respectively. Each candidate and
voter is a vector over a set of issues [ℓ] defined by ci =
〈ci,1, ..., ci,ℓ〉 ∈ R
ℓ and vj = 〈vj,1, ..., vj,ℓ〉 ∈ R
ℓ. We
consider plurality elections in which each voter is asked
to report the most preferred candidate, and the winner is
the candidate who tallies the most votes.
Suppose that the relative importance of issues to voters is
determined by a weight vector w = 〈w1, ..., wℓ〉, where
0 ≤ wk ≤ 1 for k ∈ [ℓ], and ||w||1 = 1. In this model,
a voter’s preferences over candidates are determined by
the weighted distance from each candidate in issue space.
Formally, the weighted distance between a voter vj and
candidate ci is
d(i,j) =
( ℓ∑
k=1
wk
∣∣ci,k − vj,k∣∣p
)1/p
,
p ≥ 1, and the voter prefers a candidate who is closer
according to this weighted distance measure.
Without loss of generality, suppose that c1 is the at-
tacker’s preferred candidate. In our model, an attacker
aims to influence the election by modifying the relative
importance of issues. Specifically, the attacker changes
w into a modified preference vector w′ = w + x. Re-
strictions on the attacker’s strength are given in one of
the following forms.
1. Normed Budget Constraint: Given a budgetB ∈
R the attacker’s total perturbation must be less than
the budget, i.e. ||x||p ≤ B.
2. Interval Constraint: Given a set of intervals I =
I1 × ... × Iℓ ⊂ [0, 1]
ℓ, the attacker’s new weight
vector must fall within I , i.e. wk ∈ Ik for all k ∈
[ℓ].
For both of these constraints, we consider two paradigms
for voters selecting their desired candidate.
1. Deterministic voting: Voter vj votes for candidate
c
∗
i ∈ argmincidi,j , breaking ties according to can-
didate order c1 ≺ · · · ≺ cm.
2. Stochastic voting: P(vj votes for ci) = f(vj , ci),
where f : V × C → [0, 1] is a proper probability
mapping and
∑
i f(vj , ci) = 1 for all j ∈ [n].
Both are common models translating voter-candidate
distance into voting behavior Enelow and Hinich [1990].
When voters select candidates deterministically, we con-
sider two objectives for the attacker. The first objective
(Max Support) is to maximize the total number of votes
for their preferred candidate, c1:
maximizex
∣∣{vj ∈ V : c1 ∈ argmincidi,j}
∣∣
The second objective (Majority Vote) is to win the plu-
rality vote:
c1 ∈ argmaxci∈C |{vj ∈ V : ci ∈ argmincℓdℓ,j}|,
For stochastic voting, we consider the objective of max-
imizing the expected number of votes for c1:
maximizex
n∑
j=1
f(vj , c1).
3 DETERMINISTIC VOTING
We begin by investigating our model of election con-
trol when voters always vote for their most preferred
candidate. For compactness of notation we introduce,
for every candidate and voter pair, a preference vector
which gives vj ’s unweighted preference for c1 over ci
on each issue. Let a
(i)
j,k =
∣∣ci,k − vj,k∣∣p − ∣∣c1,k − vj,k∣∣p.
The preference vector for vj of c1 over ci is a
(i)
j =〈
a
(i)
j,1, ..., a
(i)
j,ℓ
〉
. The condition for vj voting for c1 is then
ℓ∑
k=1
wka
(i)
j,k ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [m] \ {1}.
In the case of only two candidates, we omit the index i
and denote the preference vector for c1 over c2 by aj .
In this section, we will show that both Max Support and
Majority Vote are NP-hard, even when there are only two
candidates, issues are binary, and the attacker has no con-
straints on their strength. If these assumptions are further
restricted such that there are only Θ(ℓ) voters, where vk
agrees with c1 on exactly k issues, then MaxSupport is
still NP-hard.
Although both objectives are hard, even with several
strong restrictions, we present sufficient conditions for
the problem to become tractable. The following posi-
tive results hold for the normed budget constraint when
p ∈ {1, 2,∞}, and for the interval constraint with any
p ≥ 1. Under the normed budget, with p /∈ {1, 2,∞},
results also hold, however, the computed x may break
the attackers budget by some small ǫ > 0, i.e. for both
objectives we obtain, in polynomial time, a vector x that
is guaranteed to have ||x||p ≤ B+ ǫ. The tractable cases
are as follows: Max Support has a polynomial time al-
gorithm when either there are at most Θ(log(ℓ)) voters,
or the number of issues and the number of values each
issues can take on are both constant, and Majority Votes
has a polynomial time algorithm when either the num-
ber of voters is constant, or the number of issues and the
number of values each issues can take on are both con-
stant.
3.1 HARDNESS OF CONTROL IN
DETERMINISTIC SETTINGS
First we show that even for two candidates and binary
issues Majority Vote (WTCP) is NP-complete, and that
Max Support (TCWMS) is NP-hard. Both of these result
are the product of hardness reductions from the problem
of election control by issue selection Lu et al. [2019]. We
first give a formal definition of each problem used in the
reductions.
Definition 1. Let C ′ be a set of m′ candidates and V ′
be a set of n′ voters. Both candidates and voters are
vectors in {0, 1}ℓ, indicating positions on [ℓ′] issues. An
adversary selects a subset S ⊂ [ℓ′] with S 6= ∅ for the
objective of either determining if c1 can win the plural-
ity (TCIS), or maximizing the total number of votes c1
received (TCMS).
TCIS was shown to be NP-complete and TCMS to be
NP-hard by [Lu et al., 2019].
Theorem 1. For 2 candidates, n voters, and ℓ binary
issues, the problem of maximizing the number of votes
for c1, TCWMS, is NP-hard, even when B = ∞ in the
normed budget constraint, or when I = [0, 1]ℓ in the
interval constraint.
Proof. To prove this claim we will reduce from the prob-
lem of 0-1 issue selection on binary issues with two can-
didates (TCMS). An instance of TCMS is defined by a
set of n′ voters V ′ = {v′1, ...,v
′
n′} and two candidates
c
′
1, c
′
2 all of which select positions on ℓ
′ binary issues.
The objective of TCMS is to maximize the number of
votes for c′1 subject to the constraint that w
′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ
′
and ||w′||1 > 0. To reduce from a given instance of
TCMS we will add a set of voters that forces any optimal
solution to have w ∈ {0, c}ℓ for some constant c that
can be associated with 1 in the instance of TCMS. Since
B = ∞, we may assume the adversary is selecting the
weight vector w rather than a perturbation x. Without
loss of generality we may assume c′1 = 〈1, 1, ..., 1〉 and
c
′
2 = 〈0, 0, ..., 0〉.
First, let ℓ = 2ℓ′ + 2 and c1 = 〈1, 1, ..., 1〉, c2 =
〈0, 0, ..., 0〉. To encode V ′, let V1 be a set of voters ob-
tained by mapping each v′j ∈ V
′ to a voter vj where
vj,k = vj,k+ℓ′+1 = v
′
j,k for k ∈ [ℓ
′] and vj,ℓ′+1 = 1,
vj,2ℓ′+2 = 0. Compactly, each voter can be represented
as vj = 〈v′j,1, ..., v
′
j,ℓ′ , 1, vj,1, ..., vj,ℓ′ , 0〉. Next we will
introduce five more sets of voters which will force any
optimalw to be binary.
For each r ∈ [ℓ′+1] construct 8n′ℓ′ identical copies of a
voter who has vj,k = 1when (k+r) mod ℓ ≤ ℓ′+1, and
vj,k = 0 otherwise. Denote this set of voters as V2. Let
V3 be a set of voters obtained by taking each vj ∈ V2
and flipping their opinion, i.e. for each vj1 ∈ V2 add vj2
to V3 where vj2,k = 1 − vj1,k for all k ∈ [ℓ]. Note that
|V2| = |V3| = 8n′ℓ′(ℓ′ + 1).
Now let V4 be the set of 4n′ℓ′ voters such that each vj ∈
V4 has vj,ℓ′+1 = vj,2ℓ′+2 = 1 and vj,k = 0 for all other
k.
For each r ∈ [ℓ′] we create 2n′ voters of the form vj,r =
vj,r+ℓ′+1 = 1, and for each k 6= r, vj,k = 1, vj,k+ℓ+1 =
0. Call this set of 2n′ℓ′ voter V5. Lastly, for each r ∈ [ℓ′]
create 2n′ voters with vj,k = 1, vj,k+ℓ′+1 = 0 for k 6=
r, l+1, and vj,r = vj,r+ℓ+1 = 1, vj,ℓ′+1 = vj,2ℓ′+2 = 0.
Call this set of 2n′ℓ′ voters V6. Let V = V1 ∪V2 ∪ V3 ∪
V4 ∪ V5 ∪ V6.
Note that all voters outside of V1 have at least 2n′ copies
of themselves. Therefore no optimal solution will have a
voter vj1 ∈ V1 vote for c1 if doing so meant losing any
voter vj2 /∈ V1. As a result we will first examine criteria
of optimal solutions over Vc1 .
Note that the preference vector of vj has aj,k = 1 if
vj,k = c1,k and aj,k = −1 if vj,k = c2,k.
Consider the voters in V2, each of which was created ac-
cording to some r ∈ [ℓ′+1]. For each vj ∈ V2, we have
that
〈aj ,w〉 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
∑
k1∈Ir
wk1 −
∑
k2∈[ℓ]\Ir
wk2 ≥ 0
where Ir = {k ∈ [ℓ] : (k+r) mod ℓ ≤ ℓ′+1}. Similarly,
for each voter vj ∈ V3 we have
〈aj ,w〉 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
∑
k1∈Ir
wk1 −
∑
k2∈[ℓ]\Ir
wk2 ≤ 0
Therefore, all 16n′(ℓ′+1) voters can be made to vote for
c1 if ∑
k1∈Ir
wk1 =
∑
k2∈[ℓ]\Ir
wk2 ∀r ∈ [ℓ
′ + 1]
The above system of linear equations has a unique so-
lution, namely wk = wk+ℓ′+1 for all k. For any vj ∈
V2 ∪ V3, there are strictly more copies of vj than there
are total voters in all other voter sets combined. There-
fore any optimal solution must have all voters in V2 ∪V3
voting for c1. As a result we will work under the assump-
tion that wk = wk+ℓ′+1 for all k.
All voters in V4 are of the form vj,r = vj,r+ℓ′+1 = 0
for some r ∈ [ℓ′], vj,ℓ′+1 = vj,2ℓ′+1 = 1, and vj,k =
1, vj,k+ℓ′+1 = 0 for all k 6= r, ℓ′ + 1. If V4 is made to
vote for c1 then
wℓ′+1 + w2ℓ′+1 ≥ max
k
{wk + wk+ℓ′+1 : k ∈ [ℓ
′]},
which would immediately imply that
0 < wℓ′+1 = w2ℓ′+2 ≥ max
k
{wk : k ∈ [ℓ
′]}. (1)
Since there are more copies of each voter in V4 than there
are total remaining voters and since every voter in V2 ∪
V3 ∪ V4 can be made to vote for c1, no optimal solution
would have any of these voters vote for c2, and Equation
1 holds.
Finally, consider the voters in V5 and V6. Each voter in
V5 is of the form vj,r = vj,r+ℓ′+1 = 0 for some r ∈ [ℓ′],
vj,k = 1, vj,k+ℓ′+1 = 0 for all k 6= r. Each voter in
V6 is of the form vj,r = vj,r+ℓ′+1 = 1 for some r ∈
[ℓ′], vj,ℓ′+1 = vj,2ℓ′+2 = 0, and vj,k = 1, vj,k+ℓ′+1 =
0 for all k 6= r, ℓ′ + 1. Note that for each r there are
2n′ copies of the corresponding voter in V5 and of the
corresponding voter in V6, and that for each r either the
set of voters in V5 vote for c1 or the voters in V6 vote for
c1. To see this, fix any r and consider the voters in either
set. If the voter from V5 votes for c1 then it must be the
case that ∑
k 6=ℓ′+1,2ℓ′+2
wkaj,k ≥ wℓ′+1 + w2ℓ′+2
⇐⇒ wr = wr+ℓ′+1 = wℓ′+1 = w2ℓ′+2.
Alternatively, if the voter is in V6, then
− wr + wr+ℓ′+1 +
∑
k 6=r
wk − wk+ℓ′+1 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ − wr − wr+ℓ′+1 ≥ 0.
Both of the constraints cannot hold since wℓ′+1 = 0
would imply thatmaxk{wk, k ∈ [ℓ]} = 0 and
∑ℓ
k wk =
0. Again, there are 2n′ copies of each voter in V5,V6
and there remain only n′ voters left, so it must be the
case that any optimal solution gains either the voter in
V5 or in V6 for each r. Therefore, any optimal solution
must have wk ∈ {0, wℓ′+1} with wℓ′+1 > 0.
Thus, as the only voters left to sway are those in V1,
which corresponds to V , it must be the case that there
is a maximum of 8ℓ′2n′ + 13ℓ′n′ + α voters if and only
if an optimal solution in the given instance of TCMS at-
tains α voters.
When there are only two candidates, the problem of win-
ning the plurality vote becomes a special case of maxi-
mizing the number of votes for c1. The proof of Theorem
1 can be easily extended to the problem of winning the
plurality, by adding a set of voters who agree with c2 on
all issues, such that this set “cancels out” any votes for
c1 from the constructed voters. These new voters can
clearly not be won over by any nonzero weight vector.
This yields the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For 2 or more candidates, n voters, and ℓ
binary issues, the problem of determining if c1 can win
the plurality, TCWP, is NP-complete, even when B =∞
in the normed budget constraint or when I = [0, 1]ℓ in
the interval constraint..
Next, we proceed to considerably strengthen the hard-
ness result in Theorem 1. When there are only two can-
didates and issues are binary, a partial order can be in-
duced on voters by the number of issues they agree with
c1 on. That is, the set of voters can be partitioned into ℓ
tiers Sr = {vj ∈ V :
∑ℓ
k=1 aj,k = 2r − ℓ}, where Sr is
the set of voters who agree with c1 on exactly r issues.
We now show that even if for all r ∈ [ℓ] there are only a
constant number of voters who agree with c1 on exactly
r issues, maximizing the number of votes for c1 is still
NP-hard.
Theorem 3. Suppose there are only two candidates, ℓ
binary issues, and Θ(ℓ) voters. Suppose further that for
each r ∈ [ℓ]
∣∣{vj ∈ V : ∑ℓk=1 aj,k = 2r − ℓ}| ∈ Θ(1).
Then maximizing the number of voters for c1 is NP-hard,
even when B = ∞ in the normed budget constraint, or
when I = [0, 1]ℓ in the interval constraint.
Proof. To prove this claim, we will reduce from
TCWMS, which was shown to be NP-hard in Theorem 1.
An instance of TCWMS is defined by two candidates
c
′
1, c
′
2, a voter set V
′, and a set of ℓ′ issues taking on
values 0, 1.
In the constructed instance of our problem let ℓ =
n′2ℓ′2 and assume w.l.o.g. that c1 = 〈1, 1, ..., 1〉, c2 =
〈0, 0, ..., 0〉. We will construct a set of voters V that en-
codes the voters in V ′ such that the election only depends
on issues [ℓ′]. To do this, first decompose the set of vot-
ers into disjoint sets V ′ = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ Sℓ′ , such that
Sr = {v′ ∈ V :
∑ℓ′
k′=1 a
′
k′ = 2r − ℓ
′}. Starting at
r = 1, iterate through each v′j ∈ Sr and create a voter
vj such that vj,k = v
′
j,k for all k ∈ [ℓ
′], vj,k+ℓ′ = 1 for
all k ∈ [ j
2+j
2 :
j2+3j
2 ] and vj,k+ℓ′ = 0 otherwise. Un-
der this construction, for any index s ∈ [ℓ′ + 1 : n′2ℓ′2],
there is only a single j for which vj,s = 1. That is, each
voter has either
∑
s ws or −
∑
sws, for s ∈ [ℓ
′ + j
2+j
2 :
ℓ′+ j
2+3j
2 ], as terms in 〈w, aj〉. Therefore, each of these
index sets [ℓ′+ j
2+j
2 : ℓ
′+ j
2+3j
2 ] can be associated with
a single index, say j∗, where for all j 6= j∗, aj,j∗ = −1
and aj∗,j∗ = 1. Under this simplified version of indices,
we see that for vj , and for k ∈ [n′] that the contribu-
tion from all k∗ issues, to the voters preference sum is,
−w1∗−...−wj∗−1+wj∗−wj∗−1−...−wn′∗ . If we take
any three of these sums as linear inequalities for voters
vj1 ,vj2 ,vj3 , we get
−w1∗ − ...− wj1∗−1 + wj1∗ − wj1∗−1 − ...− wn′∗ ≥ 0
−w1∗ − ...− wj2∗−1 + wj2∗ − wj2∗−1 − ...− wn′∗ ≥ 0
−w1∗ − ...− wj3∗−1 + wj3∗ − wj3∗−1 − ...− wn′∗ ≥ 0
Since each 0 ≤ wk∗ ≤ 1, the only satisfying assign-
ment to these three inequalities is wk∗ = 0 for all k
∗ .
Therefore the objectives of both problems align and this
restricted version of WTCMS is NP-hard.
3.2 TRACTABLE SPECIAL CASES
We now return to the setting when there are m candi-
dates, n voters, and issues are real-valued. Although
both Max Support and Majority Vote are NP-hard even
with several strong restrictions, we now show sufficient
conditions for either objective to be computed efficiently,
as well as algorithms to do so.
Under the normed budget constraint when p ∈
{1, 2,∞}, or under the interval constraint when p ≥ 1,
if the number of voters is Θ(log(ℓ)), or the number of
issues is constant and issue values are from a set of con-
stant size, then Max Support can be computed in poly-
nomial time. For the normed budget constraint with
p /∈ {1, 2,∞}, if the maximum number of votes for c1
is α when ||x||p ≤ B, then for ǫ > 0 a perturbation
x
′ where ||x′||p ≤ B + ǫ and c1 obtains α′ ≥ α votes,
can be found in polynomial time with respect to the input
size and log
(
1
ǫ
)
. Moreover, as ǫ→ 0, α′ asymptotically
approaches α.
Under similar assumptions on the number of voters or
issues, the objective of Majority Vote can be computed
in polynomial time for the normed budget constraint
with p ∈ {1, 2,∞}, or for the interval constraint with
p ≥ 1. In the case of p /∈ {1, 2,∞}, suppose that x∗ =
argmax
x
{||x||p : c1 wins the election}, assuming c1 can
be made to win the election. For ǫ > 0 a perturbation x′
with c1 winning the election and ||x′||p− ||x∗|| ≤ ǫ, can
be found in polynomial time with respect to the prob-
lem size and log
(
1
ǫ
)
. This x′ might break the attacker’s
budget by at most ǫ. If ||x′||p ≤ B then, simply taking
x = x′ wins the election within the budget constraint.
However, in the case when B < ||x′||p ≤ B + ǫ, it will
be unknown whether there exists a x with ||x||p ≤ B
such that c1 wins the election. If the attacker is allowed
to break their budget by ǫ, i.e. ||x||p ≤ B + ǫ then tak-
ing x = x′ wins c1 the election.Further, as ǫ → 0, x′
asymptotically approaches x∗.
The existence of polynomial time algorithms for these
two objectives is particularly interesting, given that the
problem was NP-hard in the case of control by issue se-
lection even for a single voter [Lu et al., 2019].
In both cases we use Algorithm 1, where unanimity-
program, refers to an optimization program in which all
voters in the given demographic, D ⊂ V , are made to
unanimously vote for a given candidate. Recall that for
Algorithm 1:Maximizing votes for c1
Result: weight vector achieving the most voters
forD ∈ 2V do
Solve unanimity-program overD;
if unanimity-program feasible and is within budget
restriction then
Store |D| andwD;
end
end
return argmax {|D| : wD}
a given candidate–voter pair ci,vj , the vector a
(i)
j gives
vj’s per-issue preference for c1 over ci.
Under the normed budget constraint, the unanimity pro-
gram for a demographic,D ⊂ V , is given by
minimizex||x||p
s.t. ||x+w||1 = 1
0 ≤ wk + xk ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ [ℓ]〈
w + x, a
(i)
j
〉
≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [m], ∀ vj ∈ D
(2)
and under the interval constraint, the unanimity program
is given by the following linear feasibility problem:
||x+w||1 = 1
0 ≤ wk + xk ≤ 1 ∀ k ∈ [ℓ]
wk + xk ∈ Ik ∀ k ∈ [ℓ]〈
w + x, a
(i)
j
〉
≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [m], ∀ vj ∈ D
(3)
Theorem 4. Suppose there are m candidates, ℓ real-
valued issues, and n ∈ Θ(log(ℓ)) voters and the attacker
is restricted by ||x||p ≤ B, where p ∈ {1, 2,∞}. Then
Algorithm 1 computesMax Support for c1, in polynomial
time.
Proof. Since |V | = n ∈ Θ(log(ℓ)), |2V | = |2Θ(log(ℓ))| ∈
Θ(ℓ). Each subset of voters D ∈ 2V is referred to as a
demographic. For any D ∈ 2V , determining if all vot-
ers in D can be made to unanimously vote for c1 can
be computed by solving Program 2. We minimize over
||x||p in order to determine if the minimum change tow,
such that all of D votes for c1, is larger than B. That is,
demographics that cannot be made to vote for c1 come
in two forms: those where the constraint set is infeasi-
ble, and those where the value of the optimal solution is
greater than the budgetB. By selecting the largest viable
demographic, the maximum votes for c1 can be found.
For p ∈ {1, 2,∞} Program 2 can be solved in polyno-
mial time. When p = 1,∞ the program reduces to a
liner program, and when p = 2 the program reduces to
a positive definite quadratic program, all of which have
polynomial time algorithms.
Theorem 5. Suppose there are m candidates, ℓ real-
valued issues, and n ∈ Θ(log(ℓ)) voters, and
the attacker is restricted by ||x||p ≤ B, where
p /∈ {1, 2,∞}. Let x∗ = argmin
x
{||x||p :
c1 has maximum votes and ||x||p ≤ B}. Then for any
ǫ > 0 a perturbation, x′, can be computed in polyno-
mial time with respect to the problem size and log
(
1
ǫ
)
,
that obtains at least as many votes as x∗ and ||x′||p −
||x∗||p ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Similarly to Theorem 4, Program 2 can be solved
for each demographic. In contrast to Theorem 4, when
p /∈ {1, 2,∞} we are solving a general convex program,
and thus polynomial time solutions will be off by at most
a factor of ǫ. For a given demographic, D, suppose the
optimal solution to Program 2 is x∗D . Then for ǫ > 0 we
can obtain a solution x′D such that ||x
′
D||p ≤ ||x
∗
D||+ ǫ.
As before, demographics that cannot be made to unan-
imously vote for c1 come in two forms: demographics
in which the constraints of the Program 2 are infeasi-
ble, and demographics for which the optimal x∗D has
||x∗D||p > B. We need not consider demographics of
the first type, since the ǫ approximation of the convex
program will not return a vector if the constraint set is
infeasible. Via the same strategy as Theorem 4, we solve
each program and take the largest demographic that can
be made to unanimously vote for c1. The key difference
in this case, is that we may be selecting a demographic
D′ that has more voters than than the optimal solution,
and requires budget B + ǫ to obtain. Thus, if x∗ is the
smallest vector, with ||x∗|| ≤ B, that obtains the maxi-
mum votes for c1, then ||x∗|| ≤ ||x′|| ≤ B + ǫ.
Theorem 6. Suppose there are m candidates, ℓ real-
valued issues, and n ∈ Θ(log(ℓ)) voters and the attacker
has the interval constraint for some interval I ⊂ [0, 1]ℓ.
Then Algorithm 1 computesMax Support for c1, in poly-
nomial time.
Proof. Each unanimity program is now given by Pro-
gram 3, which is simply a feasibility LP. Therefore deter-
mining if a particular demographic can be made to vote
for c1 can be done in polynomial time. As stated in 4,
there are θ(ℓ) demographics that need to be checked and
thus the maximum number of votes for c1 can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. Suppose there are m candidates, n voters,
and ℓ ∈ Θ(1) issues, each of which take on values from
a set of constant size. Then Algorithm 1 computes Max
Support for c1 in polynomial time, for the normed budget
restriction when p ∈ {1, 2,∞}.
Proof. Since ℓ ∈ Θ(1) and positions are selected from
a set of constant size, say r, then only rℓ distinct vot-
ers can exist. So, there may be n voters, but at most
Θ(1) of them that need to be investigated. Let V ′ ⊂ V
be the set of all unique voters in V . For each v ∈ V ′
we also keep track of the number of times v appears
in V . So, |2V
′
| ∈ Θ(1) and there are only a constant
number of programs to solve, the only difference being
that we now choose the feasible demographic represent-
ing the maximum number of voters in V , rather than V ′.
As stated before, each program can be efficiently solved
when p ∈ {1, 2,∞}.
Theorem 8. Suppose there are m candidates, n voters,
ℓ ∈ Θ(1) issues, each of which take on values from a set
of constant size, and the attacker is restricted by ||x||p ≤
B, where p /∈ {1, 2,∞}. Let x∗ = argmin
x
{||x||p :
c1 has maximum votes and ||x||p ≤ B}. Then for any
ǫ > 0 a perturbation, x′, can be computed in polyno-
mial time with respect to the problem size and log
(
1
ǫ
)
,
that obtains at least as many votes as x∗ and ||x′||p −
||x∗||p ≤ ǫ.
Proof. We again use the idea in the proof of Theorem
7 by keeping tack of the unique voters. Once we have
the set of unique voters, the proof is identical to that of
Theorem 4.
Theorem 9. Suppose there are m candidates, n voters,
and ℓ ∈ Θ(1) issues, each of which take on values from
a set of constant size. Then Algorithm 1 computes Max
Support for c1 in polynomial time, under the interval
constraint for given intervals I ⊂ [0, 1]ℓ.
Proof. After constructing the set of unique voters, we
solve a constant number of linear programs and take the
vector yielding the largest number of votes for c1.
Theorem 10. Suppose that there are m candidates and
either n ∈ Θ(1), or ℓ ∈ Θ(1) where each issue takes
on values from a set of constant size. Then under the
budgeted constraint for p ∈ {1, 2,∞}, Majority Vote
can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. In this setting the number of unique partitions of
V is constant. Thus, if there are m candidates, there are
mΘ(1) unique ways in which each partition can be as-
signed to a candidate. This assignment of disjoint de-
mographics to candidates is equivalent to that particu-
lar demographic being made to vote for that candidate.
Each pairing, for a given partition P , can be given by a
set A = {(vjp , cip), p ∈ P}. To check if there exists
a weight vector such that the given pairing is attainable,
one need only solve Program 2, with the additional set of
linear constraints that 〈w+x, a
(ip,i)
jp
〉 ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [n],
i ∈ [m], and for all (vjp , cip) ∈ A, where a
(ip,i)
jp
is the
preference vector of vj for cip over ci. There are only
mΘ(1) programs to solve, each of which takes polyno-
mial time.
Theorem 11. Suppose that there are m candidates and
either n ∈ Θ(1), or ℓ ∈ Θ(1) where each issue
takes on values from a set of constant size. Suppose
further that the attacker is restricted by ||x||p ≤ B,
where p /∈ {1, 2,∞}. Let x∗ = argmin
x
{||x||p :
c1 wins and ||x||p ≤ B}. Then for any ǫ > 0 a per-
turbation, x′, can be computed in polynomial time with
respect to the problem size and log
(
1
ǫ
)
, that c1 wins the
election and ||x′||p − ||x∗||p ≤ ǫ.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 10, the feasibility
of each assignment of voters to candidates can be for-
mulated a convex program. An assignment of voters
to candidates is valid if the program is feasible and if
the optimal solution has value at most B. For p /∈
{1, 2,∞} these programs cannot be solved exactly in
polynomial time, but for any ǫ > 0 where 1ǫ is polyno-
mial with respect to the problem size, a solution x′, with
||x′|| − ||x∗||p ≤ ǫ, can be computed efficiently. Thus,
we obtain solutions for x′ for each program and take the
one with the smallest one under the lp norm such that c1
wins the election.
Theorem 12. Suppose that there are m candidates and
either n ∈ Θ(1), or ℓ ∈ Θ(1) where each issue takes
on values from a set of constant size. Then under the
interval constraint, for I ⊂ [0, 1]ℓ, Majority Vote can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Under the interval constraint each possible as-
signment of voters to candidates can be formulated as
a linear program. As shown in the proof of Theorem
10 there are only a constant number of such assignments
and thus we need only solve a constant number of lin-
ear programs and then choose the assignment of voters
to candidates such that c1 wins the election.
4 STOCHASTIC VOTING
Another common model for candidate selection is that
of stochastic voting, where votes are cast via a distribu-
tion over candidates Schofield et al. [1998]. More pre-
cisely, let f be a function that maps weighted distance
between a voter vj and a candidate ci to a probability
of the voter voting for this candidate. Next, we show
that election control in this setting for general f is NP-
hard even when we only have 2 candidates. For this,
suppose that f belongs to a general class of sigmoidal
functions Udell and Boyd [2013], of which the logistic
function is a well-known member.
Definition 2. A function f : [l, u] → R is said to be
sigmoidal if it is Lipshitz continuous and one of the fol-
lowing is true: f is convex, f is concave, or there exists
z ∈ [l, u] such that f is concave on [l, z] and convex on
[z, u].
We now show the hardness of maximizing the expected
number of votes for c1 even in the two-candidate case.
Theorem 13. Suppose there are 2 or more candidates, n
voters and ℓ issues, where votes are cast via a sigmoidal
function. Then maximizing the expected number of votes
for c1 is NP-hard, even when B =∞, or I = [0, 1]ℓ.
Proof. We reduce from the known NP-hard problem
Max-2SAT. An instance of Max-2SAT can be defined by
a set of ℓ Boolean variablesB = {b1, ..., bℓ} and a set of
n clauses Φ = {(x1,1 ∨ x1,2), ..., (xn,1 ∨ xn,2)} where
each xk ∈ {¬bk, bk}. Let the number of issues be ℓ + 1,
let c1 = 〈1, 1, ..., 1〉 and let c2 = 〈0, 0, ..., 0〉. Define
β1, β2 ∈ Θ(n). Create 4ℓ2n2(β1 + β2) voters of the
form vj,k = 0 for all k ∈ [ℓ] and vj,ℓ+1 = 1. For each
Boolean variable, br ∈ B create n2β1 voters of the form
vj,k = 0.5 if k /∈ {r, ℓ + 1}, vj,r = 1, and vj,ℓ+1 = 0.
Additionally, for each br, create n
2β2 voters of the form
vj,k = 0.5 for all k 6= r and vj,r = 0. Finally, we en-
code each clause as a voter. Clauses can take on one of
the three forms and we map each form to a voter in the
following way:
1. (br1 ∨ br2) yields vj,r1 = vj,r2 = 1 − vj,ℓ+1 = 0
and vj,k = 0.5 for all k 6= r1, r2, ℓ+ 1.
2. (¬br1 ∨br2) yields 1−vj,r1 = vj,r2 = 1 and vj,k =
0.5 for all k 6= r1, r2.
3. (¬br1 ∨ ¬br2) yields vj,r1 = vj,r2 = 1, vj,ℓ+1 = 0,
and vj,k = 0.5 for all k 6= r1, r2, ℓ+ 1.
Under this construction, the attacker’s objective function
can be formulated as
4n2ℓ2(β1 + β2)θ
(
−
ℓ∑
k=1
wk + wℓ+1
)
+
n∑
j=1
θ
(
〈w, aj〉
)
+
ℓ+1∑
k=1
(
n2β1θ
(
− wk − wℓ+1
)
+ n2β2θ
(
wk − wℓ+1
))
.
To complete the proof, we show that this objective is
maximized by values that can be mapped back to bi-
nary values that satisfy the maximum number of clauses.
Since θ defines a probability, 0 ≤ θ(x) ≤ 1 for any value
of x. Suppose θ is a sigmoid function defined by some
sharpness factor α. The objective function can be exam-
ined by each of its terms, starting with, θ
(
−
∑ℓ
k=1 wk+
wℓ+1
)
. Since more than 34 of voters contribute to this
term, it must be the case that θ
(
−
∑ℓ
k=1 wk+wℓ+1
)
≥ 34 ,
which implies that −
∑ℓ
k=1 wk + wℓ+1 ≥ 0 as desired.
Further, since 0 ≤ wk ≤ 1, it must be the case that
wℓ+1 ≥
3
4 .
Next consider the term β1θ (−wk − wℓ+1) +
β2θ (wk − wℓ+1) ≤ β1θ (−wk − 3/4) + β2θ (wk − 3/4)
Each of these terms is maximized at one of the extremes,
wk = 0 or wk = 1. We can always choose the
coefficients β1, β2 so that the value of the sum agrees
at wk = 0 and wk = 1. Lastly, we look at the terms
that encode the clauses, namely θ
(
〈w, aj〉
)
. Clearly
any satisfying assignment of the clause yields a greater
value for this term than any non-satisfying assignment.
However, it remains to be shown that oversatisfying any
number of clauses does not lead to a greater value of the
sum than exactly satisfying any single clause. We will
look at clauses of the form (br1 ∨ br2), but symmetric
analysis holds for the other two cases. Each of these
clauses produces a term θ
(
wr1 + wr2 − wℓ+1
)
.
So the marginal gain for over satisfying this
clauses is at most θ (1 + 1− 3/4) − θ (1− 3/4) =
(1 + e−
5α
4 )−1 − (1 + e−
α
4 )−1. where α is the sharpness
of the sigmoid function. For the sake of analysis, assume
α ≥ n, although similar techniques work for smaller α.
Then, the gain from exactly satisfying a single clause is
θ (1− 3/4)− θ (−3/4) = (1 + e−
α
4 )−1 − (1 + e
3α
4 )−1.
Thus, the gain for exactly satisfying a single clause, com-
pared to over satisfying all n clauses is (1 + e−
α
4 )−1 −
(1 + e
3α
4 )−1 − n((1 + e−
5α
4 )−1 − (1 + e−
α
4 )−1). This
term is positive for n ≥ 10. Therefore no optimal solu-
tion will over satisfy clauses unless all satisfiable clauses
have been satisfied. Therefore maximizing the expected
number of voters and maximizing the number of satisfied
clauses are equivalent.
4.1 A TRACTABLE SPECIAL CASE
While in general election control is hard even in the
stochastic model of voting, we now exhibit a special case
which is tractable. Specifically, we show that form can-
didates n voters and ℓ real-valued issues, if f is linear,
the problem of maximizing the expected number of votes
for c1 is in P, under either strength constraint.
Theorem 14. Suppose that f is linear, and there are
m candidates, n voters, ℓ real-valued issues, and the
attacker is restricted by either the normed budget con-
straint, for any p ≥ 1, or the interval constraint. Then
maximizing the expected number of votes for c1 is com-
putable in polynomial time.
Proof. We may more explicitly represent f(vj , ci) as
f(x1, ..., xm−1), where each variable xi represents
〈w, a
(i)
j 〉. Suppose that f is linear. Since a
(i)
j is a con-
stant value, and the dot product is also linear, f depends
linearly on each wk. Therefore maximizing the expected
number of voters can be formulated as a convex program
maximizex
∑
j
f
(
〈w + x, a
(2)
j 〉, ..., 〈w + x, a
(m)
j 〉
)
s.t. ||x||p ≤ B
0 ≤ wk + xk ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ [ℓ]
||w + x||1 = 1
In the case of the interval constraint, ||x||p ≤ B is be re-
placed by ℓ linear constraints of the form wk + xk ∈ Ik
for intervals Ik ⊂ [0, 1], making the above program a lin-
ear program. Therefore, under the interval constraint, the
optimal x is computable in polynomial time. However,
under the budget constraint the program is not linear, but
is still solvable in polynomial time. This can be seen by
the fact that the objective function is linear with respect
to x and the only non-linear constraint is ||x||p ≤ B.
As a result, we need only figure out the ratio of increase
that each xk gives to the objective function relative to
increase given to ||x||p.
Since f linearly depends on inner products (linear func-
tions) we may decompose the objective sum into
( ℓ∑
k=1
bkxk
)
+ C
for some constant values b1, .., bℓ, C. The constant C
can be ignored for the purposes of maximization. First
assume that we do not have the constraints 0 ≤ wk +
xk ≤ 1 or ||w + x||1 = 1. Then the program reduces to
maximizex
ℓ∑
k=1
bkxk s.t. ||x||p ≤ B (4)
The optimal solution to this programmust have the prop-
erty that,
∣∣bk1x−(p−1)k1
∣∣ = ∣∣bk2x−(p−1)k2
∣∣ ∀k1, k2 ∈ [ℓ]
Further, any optimal solution must have ||x||p = B, and
sign(xk) = sign(bk). Therefore the vector maximizing
Program (4) can be computed analytically as
x
∗ =
1
p−1
√
b1
〈
x1, sign(b2)|x1| p−1
√
b2, ..., sign(bℓ)|x1| p−1
√
bℓ
〉
Since ||x||p = B, the value of x1 is unique.
However, this may not be a feasible solution to the orig-
inal program since both the constraints that 0 ≤ wk +
xk ≤ 1 and
∑ℓ
k=1 xk = 0 have been ignored. The
first constraint, −wk ≤ xk ≤ 1 − wk, may be violated
if xk was made too large or too small in x
∗. This is
be fixed by iteratively computing solutions to Program
4 in the following way. If any xk does not satisfy the
−wk ≤ xk ≤ 1 − wk, truncate xk to either value,
depending on the sign(bk). Then remove the truncated
variables from the program and re-compute the solution.
This must terminate in ℓ or fewer steps.
Next we need only deal with the constraint that∑ℓ
k=1 xk = 0. This constraint can be satisfied by par-
titioning the xk values depending on sign(xk). Sort each
partition the by value of
∣∣ bk
xp−1
k
∣∣. If ∑ℓk=1 xk 6= 0 then
the weight on the xk’s with the smallest ratio of
∣∣ bk
xp−1
k
∣∣
can be shifted onto xk’s onto elements in the opposite
partition with the largest ratio.
Thus both constraints are satisfied without decreasing the
objective value, and we have the maximum number ex-
pected votes that c1 can obtain.
5 CONCLUSION
We consider the problem of election control in the spa-
tial model of voting, where a preference of a voter for
a candidate is determined by the distance between them
in issue space weighted by the relative importance of is-
sues to voters. We suppose that a malicious actor aims to
skew election results in favor of their preferred candidate
by changing the relative perceived importance of issues.
We show that this problem is NP-hard for the adversary
even when there are only 2 candidates, and whether vot-
ers cast their votes deterministically or stochastically. On
the other hand, we exhibit several special cases which
are tractable, including settings with a constant number
of voters or issues. Our model of spatial voting opens
a novel direction in election control, but still makes a
number of limiting assumptions, including an assump-
tion that all voters have the same relative preferences
over issues. Relaxing these is a natural subject for fu-
ture work.
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